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NOTES
Cat’s in the Cradle: Tenth Circuit Provides Silver Spoon of
Subordinate Bias Liability in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Los Angeles
Many old cats, cunning, subtle, and sharp, and bearing a
grudge against the whole race of mice beside, lay in wait for them,
caught them, and cleared them out of the house, much to the
advantage of the master of the establishment.1
I. Introduction
Stephen Peters, an African-American merchandiser for BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Los Angeles (BCI), was terminated from his position as a
merchandiser on October 2, 2001.   Peters had worked in his position in2
Albuquerque, New Mexico since May 1995 and was considered a “good”
merchandiser, having received a certificate thanking him for five years of
service and acknowledging him to be a team player.   After Peters’s firing, the3
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a complaint on his
behalf against BCI alleging discrimination on the basis of race.   In response,4
BCI asserted the reason for Peters’s termination was insubordination, and that
the human resources official who made the decision was not biased, nor did
1. JEAN LAFONTAINE, THE QUARREL BETWEEN THE DOGS AND THE CATS AND BETWEEN
THE CATS AND THE MICE (BOOK XII—NO. 8), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/
15946/15946-h/15946-h.htm#XXXIX (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).  “In the employment
discrimination context, ‘cat’s paw’ refers to a situation in which a biased subordinate, who lacks
decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to
trigger a discriminatory employment action.”  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.,
450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d
1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998)).  According to the Tenth Circuit,
the “cat’s paw” doctrine derives its name from a fable, made famous by La
Fontaine, in which a monkey convinces an unwitting cat to pull chestnuts from a
hot fire.  As the cat scoops the chestnuts from the fire one by one, burning his paw
in the process, the monkey eagerly gobbles them up, leaving none left for the cat. 
Today the term “cat’s-paw” refers to “one used by another to accomplish his
purposes.”
Id. (citing FABLES OF LA FONTAINE 344 (Walter Thornbury trans., Chartwell Books 1984);
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 354 (2002)).
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she know Peters was black.   The EEOC conceded that the human resources5
official was not biased, but argued that the bias of Peters’s supervisor, who
had an alleged history of treating black employees less favorably and of
making racially derogatory remarks, should be imputed to BCI because the
human resources official relied exclusively on the supervisor’s information.  6
The EEOC took action on Peters’s behalf pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII or the Act), which prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.   Since the inception of the Act,  a vast of amount of litigation7 8
has ensued in an attempt to define its seemingly simple prohibitions.   As a9
result, federal courts have become the central players in defining the standards
and limits of unlawful employment discrimination. 
Despite the pivotal role played by the federal courts in employment
discrimination law, few claims actually proceed to federal court.  Under Title
VII, an aggrieved employee is required to file with the EEOC prior to bringing
suit in federal court.   The EEOC is required to investigate the charge and10
determine whether to settle, dismiss, or make a no cause finding as to every
allegation in the charge.   If the EEOC does not make these determinations,11
it must find that reasonable cause exists to believe that an unlawful
employment practice has occurred or is occurring, and the agency must issue
a determination of its findings.   The EEOC’s determination of reasonable12
cause allows the agency to issue a notice of a right to sue to the employee who
filed the charge.   This does not mean, however, that the EEOC will pursue13
a claim on behalf of the aggrieved employee.  Often, the employee will be
responsible for their own legal representation.  The EEOC has the discretion
to file suit on behalf of an aggrieved employee.   The EEOC’s statistics show14
a total of 82,792 charges of employment discrimination were filed in fiscal
year 2007.   The EEOC filed 362 lawsuits as a result of these charges.   15 16
5. Id.
6.  Id.
7.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
8.  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
9.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Evidence Is Clear: Reversing Anti-
Bias Case Would Cause Hardship, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20, 1989, at 20.
10.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (2000).
11.  Id. § 1601.21. 
12.  Id.
13.  Id. § 1601.28.
14.  Id. § 1601.27.
15.  U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1997
THROUGH FY 2007 (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/5
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While thousands of charges of employment discrimination are filed each
year, as the statistics indicate, the EEOC can only file a handful of
enforcement actions, and as a result, a plaintiff often will be responsible for
his own legal costs.  As a result, many cases are never litigated.   Thus, some17
confusion still exists in employment discrimination law with respect to
proving intentional discrimination through individual disparate treatment.  18
It remains unclear when the bias of a subordinate who has no decision-making
authority will be imputed to the actual decisionmaker so as to hold the
employer liable under Title VII.  This issue has been addressed by almost all
of the Circuit Courts of Appeal,  but the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to19
definitively rule on the issue.  Accordingly, the issue of subordinate liability
is in a state of confusion and uncertainty.  The importance of the Act and the
importance of a clear rule as to employer liability for the acts of a subordinate,
both to employers and employees alike, cannot be overstated.  Thus, the issue
is ripe for the Court’s docket, and it is clear that this is an issue in which the
Court has an interest.   Given the current state of flux in disparate treatment20
law,  the smaller issue of subordinate bias liability provides the Court an21
opportunity to establish a narrow, yet bright line rule for employer liability
consistent with stare decisis.
 Almost all circuit courts agree that Title VII permits the subordinate’s bias
to be imputed to the employer.   The question becomes how much control the22
biased subordinate must exercise over the adverse employment decision.  This
note describes the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s
approach to the question of employer liability for the animus of the
Feb. 26, 2008). 
16.  U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2007 (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last
modified Feb. 26, 2008).  These statistics do not account for “private” actions; that is, those
lawsuits filed by individuals who hired their own legal representation. 
17.  Litigation is lacking for a number of reasons including cost, settlements, and the
prevalence of handling these issues through arbitration.  See generally Martha Halvordson,
Employment Arbitration: A Closer Look, 64 J. MO. B. 174 (2008).  A detailed discussion of the
merits/demerits of this lack of litigation is outside the scope of this article. 
18.  Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation
in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 493 (2006) [hereinafter Katz, The Fundamental
Incoherence].
19.  See infra Part II.
20.  See BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007).  The
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was voluntarily dismissed by the parties.  BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007).
21.  See generally Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence, supra note 18 (detailing the
general confusion surrounding causation in disparate treatment law).
22.  See infra Part II.
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subordinate.  The note supports the Tenth Circuit’s holding that employer
liability for a biased subordinate furthers the purposes of Title VII.  It further
supports the Tenth Circuit’s specific holding that defendant BCI was not
entitled to summary judgment under a causation standard of liability. 
Part II of this note gives an overview of Title VII and the Age in
Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),  the two most common23
statutes giving rise to employment litigation.  It also surveys the three
approaches to subordinate bias liability that have arisen in the circuits.  Part
III looks at BCI in detail, including the facts, the issue presented on appeal,
and the Tenth Circuit’s holding and rationale.  Part IV contends that the Tenth
Circuit’s decision was correct and argues the need for the Supreme Court to
resolve the split among the circuits.  Specifically, Part IV asserts that the
Tenth Circuit decision finds support in both agency and causation principles. 
It also defends the viability of the Tenth Circuit’s focus on the need for an
independent investigation to ensure that a subordinate’s bias has not unduly
influenced the person making the adverse employment decision and suggests
another burden shifting framework for independent investigation analysis. 
Finally, Part V concludes that the solution to subordinate bias liability exists
in the doctrine of independent investigation and that the Tenth Circuit’s
decision provided a starting point for the ultimate determination of whether
the biased subordinate caused the adverse employment action. 
II. Disparate Treatment and Subordinate Bias Liability
A. Title VII and the ADEA
Congress, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964,  evinced its intent to24
prohibit intentional discrimination by employers.   Title VII of the Act25
renders it unlawful “for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  26
Similarly, the ADEA renders it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to
hire . . . any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age.”  27
23.  Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006)). 
24.  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
25.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
26.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
27.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/5
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The conduct Title VII and the ADEA seek to prohibit has come to be
termed disparate treatment.   Under the disparate treatment theory, the28
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the employer took an adverse
employment action against him because of a characteristic he possesses which
is protected under the statute.  The burden of proving intentional29
discrimination rests at all times with the plaintiff.   In assessing whether the30
plaintiff has met his burden, two methods of proof or analytical frameworks
have developed: the McDonnell Douglas framework and the Price
Waterhouse framework.   These methods of proof, set out in more detail31
below,  have been the source of much litigation and confusion in the32
employment discrimination arena.   However, they are essential to an33
understanding of how a Title VII/ADEA plaintiff, even one arguing
subordinate bias liability, must organize their case.
1. The Burden Shifting Framework of McDonnell Douglas
It is extremely rare for plaintiffs to have “smoking gun” evidence of a
supervisor telling them or others that their firing or demotion was because of
their race, sex, or age.   Often, the employer will be able to assert a34
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment
action.  The U.S. Supreme Court developed an approach aimed at providing
courts a way to “progressively . . . sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination.”   To that end, the McDonnell Douglas35
framework provides a three step framework for allocating burdens and shifting
presumptions.   In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Court held that the36
plaintiff in a Title VII case must carry the initial burden under the statute of
28.  See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 77 (6th ed. 2003).  By way of contrast, disparate impact claims “involve
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. 
Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate-impact theory.”  Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)).
29.  Biggins, 507 U.S. at 610.  “Adverse employment action” is a general term employed
by courts and commentators to describe a range of actions an employer may take against
employee including, but not limited to termination, demotion, and failure to promote. 
30.  Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
31.  See Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence, supra note 18, at 500.
32.  See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-2.
33.  See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
109, 117-20 (2007) [hereinafter Katz, Reclaiming]. 
34.  See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.8.
35.  Id.
36.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.   If the plaintiff establishes37
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.   The38
Court further held that Title VII does not allow the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason to be used as a pretext for discrimination.   Thus, a39
plaintiff must be given a reasonable opportunity to show that the defendant
employer’s stated reason for rejection was pretextual.40
Developing the framework further, in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine the Court later held that a defendant employer’s burden was
merely to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.   The defendant did not have to persuade the41
Court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason; nevertheless, the
explanation had to be legally sufficient so as to justify judgment for the
defendant.   The Court further relaxed the burden of production for42
defendants some twelve years later by holding that even where a defendant
fails to meet their burden of production or where its proffered reasons are
deemed to be false, judgment for the plaintiff is not compelled.   Because the43
plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion, the plaintiff must show not
only that the employer’s reasons are false, but that the real reason for the
adverse employment action was discrimination.   The inference of the44
ultimate fact of discrimination was a permissive one.45
2. Price Waterhouse Framework and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a
plaintiff’s claim of constructive discharge because of the plaintiff’s sex.   A46
37.  Id.  The Court clarified that this could be done by showing that the plaintiff: (1)
belongs to a racial minority; (2) applied and was qualified for a job for which employer was
seeking applicants; (3) despite being qualified, he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
plaintiff’s qualifications.  Id.
38.  Id.
39.  Id. at 804.
40.  Id. 
41.  450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
42.  Id. at 254-55.
43.  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
44.  Id. at 512.
45.  Id. at 511. 
46.  490 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1989), superceded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1079 (codified as amended in scattered sections




plurality of the Court held that where “a plaintiff . . . shows that gender played
a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.”   The plurality47
distinguished “mixed-motive” cases, those involving both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons for the adverse employment action, from pretext cases and
found that their holding did not affect the holdings of McDonnell Douglas or
Burdine.   Rather, in “mixed-motive” cases the employer must show that it48
would have made the same decision based on the legitimate reason standing
alone.49
Concurring in the judgment, Justice O’Connor wrote separately to convey
her rationale for departing from McDonnell Douglas and Burdine “in cases . . .
where the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly
giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion.”   Justice O’Connor50
outlined two reasons for a limited divergence from McDonnell Douglas: (1)
an employer should not have a good faith presumption of complying with Title
VII where the plaintiff has produced direct evidence that the defendant
“placed substantial reliance on factors whose consideration is forbidden by
Title VII,”  and (2) the shifting of the burden of persuasion in mixed-motive51
cases serves Title VII’s purpose of eradicating discrimination.   Under Justice52
O’Connor’s articulation, when a plaintiff shows through direct evidence that
a protected characteristic was a “substantial factor” in the employment
decision, the burden of persuasion is properly shifted to the defendant to show
that the protected characteristic was not a cause of the employment decision.53
47.  Id. at 244-45 (emphasis added).  The plurality’s opinion also contained a lengthy
discussion of causation under Title VII.  Id. at 237-42.  Ultimately, the plurality rejected the
contention that the words “because of” meant “but-for” causation, finding that “[t]he critical
inquiry . . . is whether gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was
made.”  Id. at 241.
48.  Id. at 245.  “Where a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate motives . . . it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was ‘the
true reason’ for the decision . . . .”  Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
49.  Id. at 252.  The plurality characterized the premise of Burdine (and McDonnell
Douglas) as being that either a legitimate or illegitimate consideration caused the adverse
employment decision, and found that its scheme was not designed to help decide cases with both
legitimate and illegitimate motives.  Id. at 248.
50.  Id. at 261-62.  Justice O’Connor disagreed with the plurality’s analysis of causation
under Title VII, finding that “because of” manifestly meant “but-for.”  Id.
51.  Id. at 271.
52.  Id. at 272.
53.  Id. at 276.  
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Congress responded to the Price Waterhouse decision through passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act).   Specifically, the 1991 Act54
provided that an unlawful employment practice is established when the
plaintiff proves a non-legitimate characteristic was a motivating factor in the
adverse employment action.   Once the plaintiff shows that a protected trait55
was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action, liability under the
statute attaches.   The employer can come forward with evidence that it56
would have made the same decision or taken the same action despite the
presence of the protected characteristic.   This evidence limits the remedies57
available to the plaintiff; however, the defendant is still found to be liable.58
Despite the seemingly clear language of the 1991 Act, lower courts divided
over whether “direct evidence” of discrimination was required to gain a
“mixed-motive” instruction under Title VII.   In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,59
the Supreme Court answered in the negative.   The Court found no60
heightened direct evidence requirement in the statute.   Furthermore, the61
Court found the statute’s definition of “demonstrate” included no direct
evidence requirement and othyther uses of “demonstrate” within the statute
made no mention of direct evidence.   Finally, the Court found that62
circumstantial evidence should not be given any less weight than direct
evidence, thus there was no “direct evidence” requirement under the 1991 Act.63
3. The Role of Agency Principles in Title VII and the ADEA
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether a plaintiff who suffered no adverse employment action could recover
from the defendant employer on the basis of a hostile work environment
54.  Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1079 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
55.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).  The 1991 Act provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided . . . an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. (emphasis
added).
56.  Id.
57.  Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
58.  Id.  A court may grant declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and costs when an employer
shows evidence it would have taken the same action.  Id.  A court is precluded from awarding
damages or issuing an order requiring reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment.  Id.
59.  539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003).
60.  Id. at 92.
61.  Id. at 98-99.




created by alleged sexual harassment.   The Court focused on the common64
law of agency, finding that employers could be liable for the acts of their
employees acting outside the scope of their employment in certain instances.  65
Specifically, the Court found that two situations could give rise to vicarious
liability: (1) where the “‘master was negligent or reckless’”  and (2) where66
the “‘servant . . . was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.’”   In an attempt to give effect to agency principles and with67
the goal of encouraging employer forethought to establish anti-harassment
policies and procedures, the Supreme Court held that an employer was
“subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee.”   The Court further held that “when no68
tangible employment action is taken” by the employer, the employer may raise
an affirmative defense that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and that the plaintiff failed,
unreasonably, to make use “of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”69
 In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,  the Court considered70
whether a defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law when a
plaintiff had proven its prima facie case and presented sufficient evidence to
discredit the defendant’s proffered legitimate reasons for the adverse
employment action.   The Court held that the defendant was not entitled to71
judgment as a matter of law.   The Court went on to state that the72
establishment of a prima facie case and the introduction of sufficient evidence
to disprove the employer’s stated legitimate reason could permit a finding of
liability.73
64.  524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998).  
65.  Id. at 754, 765.
66.  Id. at 758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1958)).  The
Court found that negligence was the floor of liability for Title VII actions.  Id.
67.  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b)).  The Court identified
those cases where the “supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the subordinate”
as being the quintessential example of the application of the aided in agency relation standard. 
Id. at 760. 
68.  Id. at 764-65.
69.  Id. at 765.
70.  530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000).
71.  Id.  The plaintiff brought his claim under the ADEA as opposed to Title VII; however,
the Court assumed, arguendo, that the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas was
fully applicable.  Id. at 142.
72.  Id. at 153-54. 
73.  Id. at 149 (finding that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring that the plaintiff always
produce “additional, independent evidence of discrimination”).  The Court clarified that a
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The Court found that the plaintiff introduced direct evidence of age-based
animus through the discriminatory remarks of his supervisor and through
testimony that he was treated differently than younger workers similarly
situated.   The Court found that the ageist supervisor was “principally74
responsible” for the plaintiff’s termination.   Furthermore, the Court75
concluded that the supervisor was the “actual decisionmaker” behind his
termination because he wielded “absolute power” within the company, and he
berated others about how to do their jobs.76
In sum, two frameworks for proving intentional discrimination have
developed.  The McDonnell Douglas framework requires the establishment of
a prima facie case by the plaintiff, the production of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason by the employer, and the opportunity for the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant’s reason is false or a pretext for discrimination.   The77
Price Waterhouse framework applies in cases where the employer is
motivated both by legitimate and non-legitimate reasons.   After the 1991 Act78
and Desert Palace, a plaintiff is no longer required to present “direct
evidence” that an illegitimate motive operated as a substantial factor in the
employment decision.
4. The Current State of Disparate Treatment Law
The current state of disparate treatment law is, in the least, difficult to
articulate.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace,
commentators have declared everything from the death of McDonnell Douglas
to the death of Price Waterhouse.   None of these bold predictions have yet79
to come to fruition, and the McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse
showing of the falsity of the employer’s reasons and the establishment of a prima facie case will
not always be adequate to sustain a jury finding of liability.  Id. at 148.  
74.  Id. at 151.  
75.  Id.
76.  Id. at 152.  
77.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).  Again, the
establishment of a prima facie case plus proof that the employer’s reasons are false does not
mandate a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant, but allows the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of discrimination.  See supra notes 43-45.
78.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989), superceded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1079 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780
F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
79.  See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the
Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003);
Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004). 
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frameworks continue to be employed by the appellate courts.   Other80
commentators, recognizing the uncertainty of disparate treatment law, have
suggested approaches to McDonnell Douglas, Price Waterhouse and the 1991
Act which would attempt to reconcile all three—not as burdens of proof, but
as methods of proving the ultimate question: whether the employee suffered
an adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic.81
This uncertainty bleeds over into the subordinate bias liability theory
because the plaintiff is still attempting to prove individual disparate treatment. 
Thus, some of the confusion in the courts about the level of causation
necessary to find an employer liable for the bias of a subordinate can be traced
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s disparate treatment jurisprudence and its debate
over the role of causation, or more importantly, the level of causation the
plaintiff must show to hold the employer liable.   Such uncertainty calls out82
for Supreme Court intervention.  However, should the Court not be so
inclined, the subordinate bias theory can be resolved on much narrower
grounds.  As I will explain, the role of the independent investigation can serve
as a basis for analyzing whether a biased subordinate has caused an adverse
employment action without undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the role
of causation generally in individual disparate treatment claims.  Part B takes
a broad look at the relevant case law that has developed in the Circuit Courts
of Appeal when tackling the issue of employer liability for subordinate bias. 
B. Survey of Various Approaches to Employer Liability
 The courts appear to be in agreement that an employer may be held liable
for the bias of a subordinate.  Yet disagreement arises over the standard of
causation which will govern the imposition of liability.  The cases are
organized under three headings, which characterize the level of the biased
subordinate’s involvement in the adverse employment action: (1) motivating
factor (or “influence or participation”) causation, (2) “principally responsible”
causation, and (3) actual causation.  In addition, the cases themselves reveal
the difficulty of classifying a particular circuit’s approach to the issue of
employer liability.  As I will discuss, even among the same circuit, differing
standards of liability have been contemplated, thus reaffirming the need for
clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court on this specific question.
80.  See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir.
2006); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2003). 
81.  Katz, Reclaiming, supra note 33, at 116. 
82.  See Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence, supra note 18, at 491-93. 
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1. “Influence or Participation” Causation
The cases in this section generally consider the bias of a subordinate—to
the extent that it impacts the decision of an employer who takes an adverse
employment action—to be not only relevant, but also a potentially
independent basis for liability.  About half of the circuits have adopted some
form of this approach, or used language indicating support for such a position.
In Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., the First Circuit
found that the plaintiff could establish pretext in a number of ways, including
“show[ing] that discriminatory comments were made by the key
decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the decisionmaker.”   The83
court found evidence existed that the key decisionmaker and a supervisor at
Centennial made comments about the ability of a female employee to balance
a career and family and whether she could fulfill her responsibilities to the
company when she had a second child.   Furthermore, the key decisionmaker84
consulted with the plaintiff’s supervisor on an almost daily basis, and he
consulted the supervisor for his opinion regarding the plaintiff’s dismissal.  85
The court denied summary judgment for the employer, finding that the
comments of the key decisionmaker, together with the comments of the
plaintiff’s supervisor who was in a position to influence the key
decisionmaker, could allow a jury to find that Centennial’s alleged reasons for
firing Santiago-Ramos were actually a pretext for discrimination.86
In Rose v. New York City Board of Education, the Second Circuit found that
a supervisor’s remarks that he could replace the plaintiff with someone
“younger and cheaper” were direct evidence of age discrimination, especially
where the supervisor “had enormous influence in the decision-making
process.”   Furthermore, the court held that “[i]f . . . plaintiff’s . . . evidence87
is directly tied to the forbidden animus, for example . . . statements of a person
involved in the decisionmaking process that reflect a discriminatory or
retaliatory animus[,] . . . plaintiff is entitled to a burden-shifting
instruction.”   As such, the plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction under88
Price Waterhouse rather than a jury instruction regarding whether the
employer’s reasons were pretextual.89
83.  217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
84.  Id.
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d
171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992)).
88.  Id. at 161-62.
89.  Id.  While this case was decided after the 1991 Act, it was before the Desert Palace
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/5
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The Third Circuit, in Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey,
found a question of material fact as to whether the plaintiff, a college
professor, was terminated because of her religious beliefs.   In overturning90
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer, the Third
Circuit noted the involvement of two subordinate supervisors in the ultimate
decision to terminate the professor and concluded the supervisor’s previous
conduct towards the professor was relevant and probative of discriminatory
animus.   The Third Circuit held that it was “sufficient if those exhibiting91
discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to
terminate.”92
In Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, the Fifth Circuit considered the
district court’s grant of judgment for the employer notwithstanding the
verdict.   At trial, the defendant claimed that the reason for the plaintiff’s93
dismissal was not her age but rather “a change in management style.”   The94
Fifth Circuit found that Russell had provided sufficient evidence for the jury
to determine the defendant’s reason was pretext for age discrimination.  95
Russell’s evidence revealed that one employee, who wielded great influence
within the office, frequently referred to her as an “old bitch” and laughed at
her when she confronted him.   The court specifically found that “[i]f the96
employee can demonstrate that others had influence or leverage over the
official decisionmaker, and thus were not ordinary coworkers, it is proper to
impute their discriminatory attitudes to the formal decisionmaker.”   The97
decision which clarified that no direct evidence was required to obtain a burden shifting
instruction. 
90.  260 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2001).
91.  Id. at 285-86.
92.  Id. at 286; see also Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 368 (3d Cir.
2004).  In Potence, the plaintiff alleged he was not hired by the Hazleton Area School District
in violation of the ADEA.  Id.  He produced evidence that the district superintendent had
discriminatory animus against older workers.  Id. at 369.  The court focused on the fact the
superintendent was ultimately responsible for all of the hiring activities of the school district. 
Id. at 371.  Even though the superintendent was not responsible for the actual decision not to
hire the plaintiff, the court held the superintendent’s “direct ability to influence hiring and firing
decisions” was sufficient to affirm the jury’s verdict.  Id.
93.  235 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 2000). 
94.  Id. at 224. 
95.  Id. at 225. 
96.  Id. at 226. 
97.  Id.; see also Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 584 (5th Cir. 2003) (deciding that the
biased actor’s “influence or leverage over” the decision-making process was the relevant
inquiry, and dismissing the defendant’s contentions that the final decisionmaker was not biased
and conducted two independent investigations); Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 346-47 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding that the influence of negative statements by those with retaliatory motives tainted
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court looked to who actually made the decision or caused the decision to be
made and concluded it is proper to impute discriminatory animus to the
employer “if the evidence indicates that the worker possessed leverage, or
exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker.”98
In Griffin v. Washington Convention Center, the D.C. Circuit held that
evidence of a subordinate’s bias is relevant when the ultimate decisionmaker
was not insulated from the biased subordinate’s influence.   The court99
rejected the defendant’s contention that the decisionmaker was insulated from
the influence of a biased subordinate because the plaintiff had a union
representative involved in the decision to terminate.   The court found that100
the biased subordinate was the “chief source of information regarding
[plaintiff’s] job performance” and the decisionmaker was unable to
independently assess the plaintiff’s technical proficiency, the lack of which
was the stated reason for her dismissal.  101
2. “Principally Responsible” Causation102
Although the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits have held
employers liable for the mere influence or participation of a biased
subordinate in an adverse employment action, the Fourth Circuit has held
plaintiffs to a higher standard of proof on the issue of causation.  In Hill v.
Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc., the plaintiff brought claims that
she was wrongfully terminated from her employment with Lockheed Martin
because of her sex and age and in retaliation for her complaints of that
discrimination.   The defendant was granted summary judgment at the trial103
court.   On appeal, a three-judge panel reversed, finding that genuine issues104
of material fact were present that the trial court failed to consider.   The105
Fourth Circuit’s panel opinion was then vacated, and the case was reheard by
the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc.   A seven justice majority, led by Judge106
Traxler, concluded that summary judgment at the trial level was
the investigation of the final decisionmaker even if the decisionmaker had demonstrated no
bias).
98.  Russell, 235 F.3d at 227. 
99.  142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
100.  Id. at 1311.
101.  Id. 
102.  Causation is used here for organizational purposes only.  The Fourth Circuit’s decision
focused on the formal hierarchy of the employer, rather than any specific causation standard. 
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290-91 (4th Cir. 2004).
103.  Id. at 283.
104.  Id.
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
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appropriate.   By reinstating summary judgment for the employer, the Fourth107
Circuit promulgated a standard characterized as very favorable to employers. 
Four judges dissented based primarily on the majority’s analysis of the proper
level of control a biased subordinate must exercise over the decision to
terminate the plaintiff.  108
Hill had received three written reprimands under Lockheed’s standard
operating procedures (SOP).   After her third written reprimand, Hill’s lead109
supervisor, Dixon, sought advice from his supervisors, Griffin and Prickett,
about how to proceed.   Dixon was instructed to forward the paperwork to110
Griffin who, along with Prickett, made the decision to terminate Hill.   Hill111
alleged that Fultz, the safety inspector at her last job site, held a
discriminatory animus against her and that Fultz’s animus was the reason for
the final two written warnings which served as the basis for her termination.112
The Fourth Circuit found that the Ellerth decision  defined the limit of113
employer liability under agency principles to those employees who had
supervisory power or power to make tangible employment decisions.   Citing114
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,  the Fourth Circuit found that115
the person acting with discriminatory animus does not have to be the formal
decisionmaker, provided the plaintiff alleges sufficient evidence to establish
the biased subordinate was “principally responsible” or the “actual
decisionmaker” behind the adverse employment action.116
The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s contentions that liability should
be imputed to the employer when the biased subordinate substantially
influences the formal decisionmaker, or whenever the influence of the biased
subordinate is sufficient to be a cause of the adverse employment action.  117
In doing so, the court did not view Title VII and other precedent as mandating
“such an expansive view of an employer’s liability.”   Such an expansive118
view would construe the statutes as allowing a biased subordinate with no
disciplinary or decision-making authority to become a final decisionmaker
because of their substantial influence or significant role in the adverse
107.  Id. at 281.
108.  Id. at 299 (Michaels, J., dissenting). 
109.  Id. at 282. 
110.  Id.
111.  Id.
112.  Id. at 283.
113.  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
114.  Hill, 354 F.3d at 287.
115.  530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
116.  Hill, 354 F.2d at 288-89 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52). 
117.  Id. at 289.
118.  Id.
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employment action.   The court stated that employers would not be liable for119
the improperly motivated person who influences a decision, but for the person
who in reality makes the decision to take an adverse employment action
against a member of a protected class.120
Further, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff who alleges that the bias
of a subordinate should be imputed to the employer must allege sufficient
evidence to show that the subordinate employee possessed the authority to be
considered an actual decisionmaker or principally responsible for the adverse
employment action.   Applying this test, the court found that Hill failed to121
submit sufficient evidence that Fultz, the biased subordinate, had the authority
to terminate Hill or was principally responsible for Hill’s termination.  122
Instead, the court found that Dixon conducted an independent investigation of
each written reprimand, confirmed the details of Fultz’s reports, and gave Hill
an opportunity to explain her side of the story.123
According to the Fourth Circuit, the record established that Fultz, the
biased subordinate, could not be considered the one principally responsible for
Hill’s termination because an independent investigation of Fultz’s write-ups
was conducted by Dixon, and he confirmed that Hill in fact had violated
company policy.   In addition, the actual decisionmakers were Griffin and124
Prickett, thus Fultz could not be considered the actual decisionmaker because
he possessed no authority to terminate an employee.125
3. Actual Causation
Going beyond the Fourth Circuit’s “principally responsible” causation
standard, other circuits have at times required that the biased subordinate must
have been the actual cause of the adverse employment action.  Moreover,
these cases hold that the causal chain can be broken by the unbiased
decisionmaker conducting an independent investigation into the reasons for
termination.  Nevertheless, how much of an independent investigation is
required has not been fully developed.
In Long v. Eastfield College, two plaintiffs made claims for discrimination,
hostile work environment, and retaliation and appealed the grant of summary
judgment against them.   The Fifth Circuit upheld summary judgment for the126
119.  Id.
120.  Id. at 291. 
121.  Id.
122.  Id. at 297.
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at 297-98.
126.  88 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1996).
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employer on their discrimination and hostile work environment claims, but
reversed the summary judgment decision on the retaliation claim.   Long and127
Reavis, who were both terminated by Eastfield College for their participation
in duplicating a key to the Human Resources department, alleged that the true
reason for their termination was retaliation for their complaints about sexually
and racially discriminatory conduct from their supervisors.   Eastfield128
College argued that the supervisors did not terminate the employees, but rather
the president of the college, Augero, was responsible for the decision.129
In determining whether the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of
retaliation, the Fifth Circuit sought to determine whether Augero’s actions
severed the causal link between the biased recommendations of the plaintiffs’
supervisors and the plaintiffs’ eventual termination.   The court concluded130
that the plaintiffs’ supervisors only had authority to make recommendations
concerning the employment of the plaintiffs, and the final decision about any
employment action was to be made by Augero.   Thus, it determined that if131
Augero “based his decisions on his own independent investigation, the causal
link between [the supervisors’] allegedly retaliatory intent and [the plaintiffs’]
terminations would be broken.”   Nevertheless, the court also ruled that if132
Augero “rubber stamped” the supervisors’ recommendations and did not
conduct an independent investigation, the causal link between the plaintiffs’
protected activities and their eventual termination would not be broken.  133
Thus, the supervisors’ biased recommendations were not the actual cause of
the plaintiffs’ termination.
In Eiland v. Trinity Hospital, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an employer who had been
sued by a nurse claiming she was terminated because of her race.   In so134
holding, the court focused on the fact that the plaintiff’s supervisor, who made
the decision to terminate, did not rely on an allegedly biased staff physician’s
report that the plaintiff failed to follow hospital policy.   Instead, the135
plaintiff’s supervisor conducted an independent investigation of the
circumstances, which included getting the plaintiff’s version of the events.  136
127.  Id. at 309.
128.  Id. at 304.
129.  Id. at 306.
130.  Id.
131.  Id.
132.  Id. at 307.
133.  Id. 
134.  150 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 1998).
135.  Id. at 752.
136.  Id. 
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The court found there was no causal connection between the staff physician’s
allegedly discriminatory conduct and the supervisor’s ultimate decision to
terminate.137
In Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., the plaintiff contended she was
the victim of sexual discrimination.   Llampallas argued she was fired by138
defendant Mini-Circuits after her sexual relationship with her supervisor
ended.   Llampallas further alleged she was terminated because her139
supervisor was biased against her and that he threatened to quit himself if the
defendant did not terminate Llampallas.   The Eleventh Circuit found that140
the supervisor’s bias could not be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker
because he afforded an opportunity for the plaintiff to present her side of the
story and make the defendant aware of the supervisor’s discrimination.   The141
court found that “[w]hen the employer makes an effort to determine the
employee’s side of the story before making a tangible employment decision
affecting that employee . . . it should not be held liable under Title VII for that
decision based only on its employee’s hidden discriminatory motives.”142
Finally, in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
judgment against multiple defendants in a Title VII claim based on sex
discrimination.   The plaintiff, a female police officer with a “troubled143
disciplinary record” was terminated after an outburst at a doctor’s office while
in uniform.  The City of Tuscaloosa Police Chief recommended that the144
plaintiff be terminated; however, the authority to terminate the plaintiff lay
with the city’s civil service board, and they made the decision to do so.  145
The court held that where a biased party makes a termination
recommendation but actually has no authority to do so, the plaintiff must
prove the biased party’s recommendation was the direct cause of the
termination.   The court found that even if the plaintiff presented enough146
evidence to show discrimination on the part of the plaintiff’s employer, the
causal link between that animus and the plaintiff’s ultimate termination was
broken by the independent decision of a civil service board to uphold the
137.  Id.; see also Maarouf v. Walker Mfg. Co., 210 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2000); Willis v.
Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1997).  
138.  163 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 1998).
139.  Id.
140.  Id.
141.  Id. at 1249.
142.  Id. at 1250.
143.  186 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999). 
144.  Id. at 1329-30.
145.  Id. at 1330.
146.  Id. at 1331.
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termination.   Here, the plaintiff had an opportunity to present her side of the147
story in a three day hearing that included representation by legal counsel and
the opportunity to put on a defense and witnesses.   The court declined to148
adopt any bright line rule defining when an independent investigation will not
suffice for the employer to avoid liability, but it noted that it could not
imagine any other type of hearing which might provide plaintiffs with a more
independent and fair opportunity to present their side of the story.149
Unlike the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeal, the Tenth Circuit had never found for a plaintiff claiming
liability for the bias of a subordinate until EEOC v. BCI Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Los Angeles, but it had signaled its support for the theory.  150
III. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles
A. Facts
As the most senior merchandiser at BCI’s Albuquerque, New Mexico
facility, Peters had the most desirable schedule and did not have to work on
Saturday or Sunday.   Peters reported to Jeff Katt, a white male who151
supervised Peters on a day-to-day basis, and to Cesar Grado, a Hispanic male,
who supervised both Katt and Peters.   It was common for merchandisers to152
call in sick to Katt, even though Grado handled all scheduling and route
assignments.   Grado was responsible for supervising, monitoring, and153
evaluating the employees underneath him, but had no authority to terminate
or discipline employees.   He did, however, have broad authority to bring154
facts concerning employee performance to the attention of the Human
Resources Department, who determined whether a company policy applied
and whether any disciplinary action was necessary.155
Sherry Pederson was the highest ranking human resources official in the
Albuquerque office, and her immediate supervisor was Pat Edgar, who worked
147.  Id.
148.  Id. at 1332.
149.  Id. 
150.  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006).
151.  Id. at 478.  Merchandisers are hourly employees who place Coca-Cola products in
grocery stores and other retail stores and are responsible for arranging, cleaning and rotating
product displays.  Merchandisers work five days per week with staggered schedules so that they
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in Phoenix, Arizona.   It was undisputed that neither Pederson nor Edgar had156
met Peters, and neither knew he was African-American.   The weekend prior157
to Peters’s termination, Grado faced a shortage of merchandisers and ordered
Katt to direct Peters to work on Sunday, September 30.   Some dispute in158
facts arose as to the chain of events over the weekend.  In sum, Peters
indicated that he did not want to work, and Grado told Peters he did not have
a choice.   Grado contacted Edgar to seek advice about how to handle the159
situation with Peters.   Edgar advised Grado that Peters’s actions could be160
considered insubordination.  Insubordination was a violation of company
policy for which Peters could be terminated, unless he had a compelling
reason not to come into work on Sunday.   Peters was informed of the risk161
of termination if he failed to report to work, and in response he said, “Do what
[you] got to do and I’ll do what I got to do.”162
 Peters did not show up for the shift on Sunday, and it was covered by
Grado.   Peters had gone to a clinic on Saturday night where he was163
diagnosed with a sinus infection and told not to return to work until
Monday.   Peters informed Katt of this fact, and he was told that returning164
to work on Monday would not be a problem.   On Monday, Grado informed165
Pederson of the fact that Peters had missed work.   Edgar pulled Peters’s166
personnel file and found that Peters had been suspended previously and issued
a final warning for insubordination.   By the end of the day, Edgar made the167
decision to terminate Peters.168
Much of the factual dispute in this case arises over the conversations
between Peters and Grado and over BCI’s proffered reasons for terminating
Peters.  First, Grado directed Katt to contact Peters to let him know he needed
to be at work on Sunday.   Peters told Katt that he could not work on Sunday169
because he had plans.   According to Grado, when Katt relayed this170
156.  Id. at 479.
157.  Id. at 481.
158.  Id. at 479.
159.  Id. 
160.  Id.
161.  Id.
162.  Id. 










conversation to him, Katt added that Peters said he might call in sick;
however, Peters and Katt both deny that Peters said anything about being sick
during that conversation.   Further, in his declaration to the court, Grado171
stated that he had already discussed the matter with Katt and that Peters had
already agreed to work on Sunday.172
Second, there was some conflict between Edgar’s stated reasons for
terminating Peters and the reasons listed in Peters’s termination paper.   The173
date of violation was also in conflict, with the termination paper listing the
violation date as Sunday, September 30, rather than Friday, September 28, as
Edgar claimed to the court.   Finally, the court noted that Pederson’s review174
of Peters’s personnel file was so hasty that she did not even gather basic
information about Peters, such as his race, which was listed on several
documents within the file.   The court found this interesting in light of175
Pederson’s duties as a human resources official to train BCI management in
affirmative action and equal opportunity issues.176
 Edgar, the Human Resources Officer, determined late Friday that Peters’s
conduct in his conversation with Grado, standing alone, constituted
insubordination which warranted termination, but made no decision to do
so.   On Monday, Edgar held a series of phone meetings with Pederson and177
Grado concerning Peters’s conduct, and Pederson pulled Peters’s personnel
file and discovered a previous incident of insubordination which resulted in
a two-day suspension and a final warning from a different supervisor.  178
Peters was terminated, and the EEOC filed a complaint on his behalf against
BCI, claiming unlawful discrimination on the basis of race.
B. Issue
The district court employed the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis in resolving Peters’s claim.   BCI conceded that the EEOC179
171.  Id.
172.  Id. at 479 n.1.  The court found it interesting that Grado felt the need to have Katt
contact Peters again.  Id.




177.  Id. at 480.
178.  Id.  The incident was similar in nature to one giving rise to the litigation.  Id.  Peters
was ordered to work on his weekend off, but refused and was “rude and unprofessional.”  Id. 
However, Peters had good reason to miss work because his fiancée’s son, whom he was close
to, had been killed in a car accident, and he was acting as a pallbearer at the funeral.  Id.
179.  Id. at 483-84.  The McDonnell Douglas framework was appropriate because the issue
involved a question of whether BCI’s stated reasons for the termination were pretextual rather
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established a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination by
showing that Peters was African-American, he was qualified for his position
as a merchandiser, he was terminated from his position, and the position
remained open.   The burden then shifted to BCI to articulate a legitimate,180
non-discriminatory reason for the termination.   The EEOC conceded that181
BCI successfully did this by asserting the insubordination of Peters in his
phone conversation with Grado on Friday, September 28.182
Thus, the only remaining issue for the court’s consideration was whether
the EEOC made a sufficient showing that BCI’s stated reason for termination
was actually a pretext for discrimination.   It was undisputed that Edgar, who183
made the formal decision to terminate Peters, did not act with racial animus
and did not even know Peters’s race.   The EEOC had to prove that Grado184
displayed racial animus toward black employees and that this animus should
be imputed to BCI even though Grado did not have the authority to terminate
any employee.   The district court found that the EEOC had raised a genuine185
issue of material fact as to Grado’s racial animus, but that the agency failed
to prove there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether BCI’s
proffered reasons were pretextual.   Therefore, the court granted summary186
judgment in favor of BCI.   On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the EEOC187
contended the district court erred in its holding, arguing that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether BCI’s proffered reasons for
terminating Peters were false.  Thus, the EEOC argued an inference could
arise that BCI acted for discriminatory reasons.188
C. Holding and Rationale
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in its grant of summary
judgment.   The appellate court agreed with the district court that a genuine189
than a question of whether the adverse employment action was motivated by both legitimate and
illegitimate motives. 
180.  Id. at 484.
181.  Id.  Again, this is only a burden of production and not persuasion. 
182.  Id.  The court noted that BCI maintained “that Mr. Peters’ absence on Sunday,
September 30 had nothing to do with the decision, except insofar as it confirmed that Peters’
statements on Friday were insubordinate.”  Id. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id.
185.  Id. 
186.  Id. at 483.
187.  Id.
188.  Id. at 483, 490.
189.  Id. at 478.
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issue of material fact existed as to Grado’s racial animus.   Further, the190
appellate court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
BCI’s stated reasons for terminating Peters were pretextual.   Specifically,191
the Tenth Circuit noted that the EEOC had raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether Grado’s bias translated into discriminatory actions that caused
Peters’s termination.192
The appellate court found three sets of facts important in determining that
there were questions of material fact as to the racial animus of Grado.   First,193
the EEOC produced at least three examples of racial jokes and put-downs
spoken by Grado, and Katt indicated that Grado may have used a racial epithet
near the time of Peters’s termination.   Second, affidavits were produced194
which tended to prove disparate treatment between African-American
merchandisers and Hispanic merchandisers.   Third, the court found that195
Grado responded very differently to a Hispanic employee who was ordered to
work on his off day.   While the Hispanic employee did not act in a defiant196
manner, Grado reportedly responded that an employee could not be expected
to work on their day off.   Thus, a jury could infer racial animus on the part197
of Grado as the reason for the disparity in treatment.198
The Tenth Circuit closely examined BCI’s proffered reasons for
terminating Peters and determined that a reasonable jury could find them to
be a pretext for race discrimination.   BCI’s reasons were characterized as199
a two part contention: first, that it terminated Peters for his conduct on the
phone with Grado, and second, that Peters’s failure to show up for work
merely confirmed his already insubordinate activity.   Grado’s first200
explanation, the Disciplinary Status Notice, and paperwork filed by BCI with
the New Mexico Department of Labor all claimed the reason for Peters’s
termination was his failure to show up for work.   Only later, BCI201
characterized its decision as resulting from Peters’s conduct on the phone
190.  Id. at 489.
191.  Id. at 493. 
192.  Id. at 492-93.
193.  Id. at 489. 
194.  Id.
195.  Id.  The disparate treatment included demeaning and threatening African-American
employees with schedule changes and being unusually picky as to an African-American’s work
in merchandising and stocking.  Id. at 489-90.
196.  Id. at 490.
197.  Id.
198.  Id. 
199.  Id.
200.  Id.
201.  Id. at 490-91.
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rather than his absence from work.   The court concluded that a jury could202
find that BCI’s original reason for terminating Peters was pretextual because
he was in fact excused from working.203
The Tenth Circuit also concluded that a reasonable jury could find BCI’s
other explanation for terminating Peters—his phone conduct—was a pretext
for race discrimination because of Grado’s racial animus.   Edgar relied204
exclusively on Grado’s account of the Friday phone conversation and did not
conduct an independent investigation into the allegations, failing to even ask
Peters for his version of the events.   Because Grado’s report that Peters was205
defiant and insubordinate caused the actual termination, a jury could find that
Grado’s report was influenced by racial discrimination, and thus that BCI’s
proffered reason was in reality a pretext for race discrimination.206
The Tenth Circuit dismissed BCI’s contention that the factual disputes
between Grado and Peters concerning their conversation on Friday, September
28, should be ignored because it is undisputed that Peters ended the
conversation “by saying ‘[d]o what [you] got to do and I’ll do what I got to
do.’”   Furthermore, if the basis of Edgar’s decision to terminate had been207
only Grado’s report of this comment, “there would be no reason to believe that
racial bias on the part of Mr. Grado caused the termination.”   However,208
there were three additional facts reported by Grado which were disputed by
Peters and Katt.   First, Grado reported that he had learned that Peters was209
already planning on calling in sick two days previously.   Second, he210
reported that he asked Peters to reveal his plans and gave Peters an
opportunity to explain his scheduling conflict.   Third, he reported to Edgar211
that Peters replied angrily that it was none of Grado’s business and that Peters
was yelling.   Thus, Edgar could have relied on the additional facts supplied212
by Grado in making her decision to terminate because her reaction to these
facts indicated she found them important in determining the appropriate
punishment.   The relevant question was what actually caused Peters’s213
202.  Id. at 491. 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id. at 491-92. 
207.  Id. at 492.
208.  Id.







termination and not what could have caused his termination.   Under this214
approach, a jury’s crediting of Katt’s and Peters’s testimony would mean a
discrediting of Grado’s version of events, thus a conclusion that Grado lied to
Edgar about the additional facts.215
The Tenth Circuit also dismissed BCI’s contention, and the district court’s
agreement, that BCI conducted an independent investigation sufficient to
break any causal chain between Grado’s bias and Peters’s termination.  216
According to the court, the independent investigation consisted of one action:
the pulling of Peters’s personnel file.   This action was “inadequate, as a217
matter of law, to defeat the inference that Mr. Grado’s racial bias tainted the
decision.”   The court focused on the fact that the file did not give Edgar a218
way to independently confirm Grado’s story, and even though it contained a
previous incident of insubordination, Edgar never sought any other version of
the events other than Grado’s.219
IV. Analysis
A. The Need for Supreme Court Action
While the Supreme Court will not have an opportunity to rule on the Tenth
Circuit’s approach in BCI because of the party’s voluntary dismissal of the
petition for certiorari,  the need for a definitive ruling on the issue of220
subordinate bias liability still remains.  The disagreement among and within
circuits, in addition to the important nature of Title VII for both employees
and employers, necessitates Supreme Court attention.
A comparison of the Fifth Circuit’s jurisprudence provides the clearest
example of intra-circuit conflict on the issue of subordinate bias liability. 
Long was the first decision within the Fifth Circuit to recognize the theory of
subordinate bias liability.   The Long court found that the plaintiff’s221
retaliation claim could survive summary judgment because a causal link had






219.  Id. at 492-93.
220.  See BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007).  The
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was voluntarily dismissed by the parties.  BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007).
221.  Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the claims
before it did not fit neatly into any previous analysis the court had done of employer liability
for wrongful termination decisions based on recommendations of other employees). 
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plaintiff’s termination.   The court went on to hold that the employer could222
show that the causal nexus was broken if the final decisionmaker, by whom
no retaliatory motive was alleged, conducted an independent investigation.223
Six years later, the Fifth Circuit again considered the issue of biased
subordinate liability.  In Gee v. Principi, the court found that a plaintiff could
survive summary judgment because she had produced sufficient evidence to
allow a trier of fact to conclude that the final decisionmaker had been
improperly influenced by supervisors with retaliatory motives.   In so doing,224
the court characterized the inquiry under Long as “whether the ultimate
decisionmaker conducted an independent investigation or was influenced by
the retaliatory animus of those who participated in or knew about the alleged
harassment.”   Further, the court found that “[i]f the ultimate decisionmaker225
was influenced by others who had retaliatory motives, then his investigation
cannot in any real sense be considered independent.”   Thus, the majority226
found that the decisionmaker’s selection process did not meet the
“independent investigation” requirement of the Fifth Circuit.   The227
dissenting judge characterized the Long decision as providing that a
decisionmaker who was influenced by biased subordinates could “purge the
taint of retaliatory motives by conducting a subsequent independent
investigation.”   The dissenting judge found the decisionmaker did conduct228
an independent investigation through his interviews of the plaintiff and her co-
workers, concluding: “no reasonable jury could find that [the decisionmaker]
merely ‘rubber stamped’ the recommendations of [the biased
subordinates].”229
The intra-circuit conflict demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit is only
magnified by the conflict between the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits.  As demonstrated in Part II.C, each circuit has established its own
test for determining when an employer can be held liable.   The test230
employed by the court could have a profound impact on whether the case is
resolved at the summary judgment level or whether a full trial is needed.  The
confusion that remains may stem from the particular facts of each case. 
Employment law cases are inherently fact driven, and as such it is difficult to
222.  Id. at 307-08.
223.  Id.
224.  289 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2002).
225.  Id. at 346 n.2.
226.  Id.
227.  Id. at 347.
228.  Id. at 349-50 (Garza, J., dissenting).
229.  Id. at 350 (Garza, J., dissenting).
230.  See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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develop a single rule that can cover all scenarios.  Further, when a court is
faced with a particularly forceful set of facts counseling either in favor of or
against employer liability, it is not pressed with a need to speak with precision
about the standards which will govern liability.
Because Title VII is a federal law, the Supreme Court has a duty to interpret
its meaning.  Furthermore, there is a practical need for guidance for
employers, especially those whose reach is nationwide, to know the contours
of the subordinate bias theory so they can adopt policies to effectuate its
purpose: ensuring that an adverse employment action is taken for legitimate
reasons.  The Court has set the stage for approving the theory of subordinate
bias liability, and one might argue, has given it implicit approval. 
Nevertheless, the time has come for the Supreme Court to give explicit
approval to the subordinate bias theory of liability under Title VII and the
ADEA and to craft the theory’s boundaries so as to give guidance to
employers and employees.
B. The Tenth Circuit Reached the Correct Result
The Tenth Circuit was correct to hold that BCI was not entitled to summary
judgment based on the factual record.   Moreover, the Tenth Circuit’s231
analysis of the legal issues was also correct because it was supported by
agency and causation principles.232
1. Agency Principles Support the Tenth Circuit’s Decision
Title VII defines an employer to include “any agent of such a person.”  233
Relying on this language, the Tenth Circuit rightly rejected the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in Hill.   Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis finds234
support in both Supreme Court and other federal appellate court opinions. 
While only federal appellate courts have endorsed agency principles as
providing a basis to impose liability for the bias of subordinates, the Supreme
Court has signaled its approval of agency law as a basis for liability in other
Title VII actions.235
a) Tenth Circuit Rightly Rejected the Fourth Circuit’s Approach in Hill
In rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s approach, in BCI the Tenth Circuit found
their sister circuit’s focus on the term “decisionmaker” misplaced and noted
231.  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 493 (10th Cir. 2006).
232.  Id. at 485.
233.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
234.  Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004).
235.  See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755 (1998); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
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that Title VII and the ADEA imported agency law principles for determining
liability.   The court, relying on Ellerth, held that employers could be liable236
for the action of “decisionmakers” and other agents who cause injury while
being aided by the agency relation.   Additionally, the court contended that237
the deterrent effect of subordinate bias liability was undermined by the Fourth
Circuit’s approach because the employer can avoid liability for a biased
subordinate who causes an adverse employment action if it can show that the 
biased subordinate did not exercise complete control over the adverse
employment decision.238
As a result of the Fourth Circuit’s focus on who was “principally
responsible” or the “actual decisionmaker,” the Hill decision failed to take
into account Title VII’s incorporation of agency principles as a basis for
liability.  The Tenth Circuit was correct in rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s
“principally responsible” standard and relying on agency principles to find
that BCI could be held liable for Grado’s bias.239
b) Other Federal Circuits Support the Application of Agency Principles
to Title VII
Other federal circuit courts of appeals have found support in agency law for
subordinate bias liability.  In so doing, they have recognized that Title VII’s
inclusion of the term “agent” was not meaningless;  rather, it served as a way240
of ensuring that the statute’s purposes were not skirted by allowing employers
to vest lower level supervisors or other co-workers with the ability to
discriminate.241
In Hamilton v. Rodgers, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a “‘person is an
agent under § 2000e(b) if he participated in the decision-making process that
forms the basis of the discrimination.’”   The court found that the plaintiff’s242
236.  BCI, 450 F.3d at 487. 
237.  Id.  Some disagreement seems to exist, at least on the Supreme Court, as to the
particular provision of agency law which will govern liability.  See infra note 258 and
accompanying text.  The Tenth Circuit, in relying on Ellerth, found that the “aided by the
agency relation” standard clearly applied to “cat’s paw” or “rubber stamp” liability claims.  Id.
at 485-86.  The merit of this contention and the specific provision of agency law which should
provide liability is an issue outside the scope of this note. 
238.  Id.
239.  Id.
240.  Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
241.  See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1990).  
242.  791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Jones v. Metro. Denver Sewage Disposal
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/5
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supervisors were agents of the employer, despite their intermediate standing
within the organization.   Furthermore, the supervisors “wielded [their]243
authority to [plaintiff’s] detriment.”244
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Miller v. Maxwell’s International, Inc.,
discussed Title VII and the ADEA and found that “[t]he obvious purpose of
this [agent] provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the
statute.”   The court found that the agency provision encouraged employers245
to ensure that supervisory personnel did not violate Title VII because they
could be held liable for such violations.246
In Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., the Third Circuit found that two
supervisory employees were agents for purposes of Title VII.   The court247
found that the supervisory employees “had the direct ability to influence
hiring and firing decisions with respect to the [plaintiff].”   The court held248
that the actions of these supervisory employees could be imputed to the
defendant, and the defendant could be liable for the supervisory employee’s
discriminatory actions.249
In Shager v. Upjohn Co., Judge Posner, writing for a unanimous Seventh
Circuit panel, considered the role of agency in the ADEA and Title VII and
found that the statute left to the courts the job of determining “whether to
apply the doctrine of respondeat superior in [ADEA or Title VII cases].”  250
Looking to the Supreme Court’s decision in Vinson, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court’s concern over strict liability for
Dist., 537 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Colo. 1982)). 
243.  Id. at 442.
244.  Id.  The court ultimately held that this finding of agency meant that the supervisors, in
their individual capacity, could be held liable for the violations of Title VII.  Id. at 445.  Despite
this, the court still recognized the role of agency principles in Title VII litigation.  Id. at 442-43. 
245.  991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (alteration in original).
246.  Id. at 588.  The court found that “[n]o employer will allow supervisory or other
personnel to violate Title VII when the employer is liable for the Title VII violation.  An
employer that has incurred civil damages because one of its employees believes he can violate
Title VII with impunity will quickly correct that employee’s erroneous belief.”  Id.  The court,
in rejecting individual employee liability in favor of employer liability under Title VII’s agency
provision, was responding to the Fifth Circuit’s argument that not holding individual
supervisors liable would encourage violations of Title VII.  Id.
247.  909 F.2d 747, 752 (3d Cir. 1990). 
248.  Id.  The citation of this case as support for the Tenth Circuit’s decision on agency
grounds does not imply that this case is in agreement with the Tenth Circuit as to the level of
causation that should attend employer liability.  It simply serves to show that other circuits have
found agency principles as a basis for imputing the bias of a subordinate with no decision-
making authority to the employer.
249.  Id.
250.  913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990).
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harassment by a fellow employee had no place where the challenged adverse
employment action was termination by a supervisory employee.  251
Specifically, Judge Posner found that a “supervisory employee who fires a
subordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is authorized to do”  and that252
such action could be said to be within the scope of his employment.   This253
finding led to the conclusion that if the committee who made the decision to
terminate the plaintiff acted as the cat’s paw of the ageist supervisor, the
innocence of the committee members would not spare the company from
liability.254
c) Supreme Court Precedent Supports the Application of Agency
Principles
Just as the Circuit Courts have relied on agency principles, the Supreme
Court has similarly found that “Congress wanted courts to look to agency
principles for guidance in [Title VII].”   In Burlington Industries, Inc. v.255
Ellerth, the Supreme Court relied on agency principles and found that an
employer could be held liable for the creation of a hostile work environment
by a supervisor with immediate or higher authority over the affected
employee.   While the Supreme Court has stated that agency law may not be256
“transferable in all [its] particulars” to Title VII,  such a statement does not257
preclude the imposition of liability when the acts of the subordinate supervisor
result in an adverse employment action.  The Court simply held that strict
liability was not required under the statute and that the common law of agency
should be considered in defining employer liability.258
251. Id.
252. Id. at 405.
253. Id.  Judge Posner looked to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) as
a basis for imposing liability, finding that “the ultimate concern is with confining the
[employer’s] liability to the general class of cases in which he has the practical ability to head
off the injury to his [biased employee’s] victim.”  Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
254. Id.  Shager is commonly recognized as applying the cat’s paw metaphor to the issue of
subordinate bias liability.  See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 485
(10th Cir. 2006).
255.  Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).  
256.  524 U.S. 742, 765; see also supra Part II.B.3.  The Court in Ellerth was considering
a sexual harassment claim rather than a racial discrimination claim, but both are actionable
under Title VII.  Thus, there is ample reason to believe that the same agency principles could
provide vicarious liability for an employer when an employee suffers an adverse employment
action as the result of a biased supervisor who does not have final decision-making authority.
257.  Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72. 
258.  Id.  Even Justices Thomas and Scalia conceded the potential for employer liability
under agency principles in their Ellerth dissent.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 772-73 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).  The dissent was based primarily on the majority’s use of the “aided in agency
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/5
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2. Causation Principles Support the Tenth Circuit’s Decision
In addition to agency law, principles of causation support the Tenth
Circuit’s holding in BCI.  In order to prove a violation of Title VII, a plaintiff
must show that an adverse employment action was taken against them
“because of” some protected characteristic such as race or sex.   This259
“because of” requirement has long been understood to impose a burden on
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the consideration of a protected characteristic
was the cause of the adverse employment action.   Even a plaintiff260
proceeding under the theory that the subordinate’s bias should be imputed to
the employer must demonstrate a causal nexus.  Unfortunately, courts
considering these claims have employed imprecise language and have not
carefully crafted the boundaries of the theory.   The practical result is261
confusion about how much control or influence a biased subordinate must
have over the decision-making process before their bias will be imputed to the
employer.
The Tenth Circuit decision is in accord with much of the precedent on the
issue of subordinate liability.  Where it differs from other circuits, the court’s
position is justified as striking a better balance between the remedial aims of
the anti-discrimination statutes and ensuring that the causation requirement is
met.  Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis brings certain clarity to an
issue in which it has been difficult for courts to employ language giving clear
guidance.
a) The Tenth Circuit’s Causation Focus Is Supported by Precedent
The Fifth Circuit, at least in the Long opinion, has recognized the
importance of the causation requirement.   The Long court found that the262
plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that
their supervisors acted with intent to retaliate against the plaintiffs.   This263
retaliation took the form of recommending that the plaintiffs be terminated.  264
The court found that the causal link between the supervisor’s retaliatory intent
and the plaintiffs’ termination was established, unless the defendants could
relation” standard rather than a “negligent or reckless” standard under agency law.  Id.  
259.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).  
260.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262-63 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
261.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b.
262.  Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1996).
263.  Id.
264.  Id. at 308.
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show that the final decisionmaker had conducted an independent
investigation.265
In Wilson v. Stroh Companies, Inc., the Sixth Circuit considered a claim by
the plaintiff that his direct supervisor’s racial animus should be imputed to the
managers who made the termination decision.   The court found the ultimate266
question was whether the plaintiff had submitted evidence that the
supervisor’s racial animus caused the termination.   The corporate industrial267
relations manager conducted an independent investigation of the plaintiff’s
conduct and recommended termination, a recommendation which the general
manager followed.   The court found that “[t]he causal nexus necessary to268
support [the plaintiff’s] prima facie case [was] absent.”269
In Lust v. Sealy, the Seventh Circuit clarified that the “cat’s paw” formula
required that the animus of the subordinate be a cause of the adverse
employment action.   Additionally, in Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits Lab, the270
Eleventh Circuit held that no causation could be found between a
subordinate’s animus and the plaintiff’s termination.   The court found the271
chain of causation was broken by the employer’s efforts to independently
investigate the situation surrounding the plaintiff and by the opportunity given
to the plaintiff to provide her side of the story.272
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in English v. Colorado
Department of Corrections, holding that the decisionmaker’s “attempt to
balance the investigators’ findings with [the plaintiff’s] own version of events
cuts off any alleged bias on the part of the investigators from the chain of
events leading to [the plaintiff’s] termination.”273
In keeping with its own precedent and that of other federal circuits, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized the importance of the biased subordinate actually
causing the adverse employment action, and the ability of the employer to
ensure this casual chain is broken by conducting an independent investigation. 
The court expressly determined that “the biased subordinate’s discriminatory
265.  Id. at 307.
266.  52 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1992).
267.  Id. at 946; see also Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir.
2001) (applying the subordinate bias liability theory in the context of a claim of interference
with the formation of a contract because of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)). 
268.  Wilson, 952 F.2d at 946.
269.  Id.
270.  383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004).  The court specifically rejected the Fourth Circuit’s
approach to the issue of subordinate bias liability.  Id.
271.  163 F.3d 1236, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 1998).
272.  Id. at 1250.
273.  248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001).
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reports, recommendation, or other actions [must have] caused the adverse
employment action” for the employer to be liable.274
Furthermore, the court found that “an employer can avoid liability by
conducting an independent investigation of the allegations against an
employee”  because when the employer does not rely exclusively on275
information provided by the biased subordinate the causal link is broken.  276
Additionally, the court stated that an inference of a racially discriminatory
employment decision may be defeated by simply asking an employee for his
version of the events.277
The Tenth Circuit’s focus on the causation requirement is supported by the
“because of” language in Title VII. Additionally, it is buttressed by the
independent investigation requirement.  By focusing on causation as a
necessary element of the plaintiff’s case, the court ensured that the cat’s paw
theory did not become a means for a plaintiff who could not prove intentional
discrimination to make an end-run around the statute by alleging a that a low
level supervisor’s racial animus somehow impacted the decision to take an
adverse employment action.
b) The Tenth Circuit’s Causation Focus Clarifies Precedent
Other cases from the United States Courts of Appeals seem to be in conflict
with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in BCI.   For example, in Abramson, the278
Third Circuit found that liability could attach if persons with discriminatory
animus merely influenced or participated in the decision to take an adverse
employment action.   The court further held that the record in the case before279
it demonstrated that the actual decisionmaker was influenced by the biased
subordinates, thus there was “ample evidence to support [plaintiff’s] religious
discrimination claim.”280
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has characterized the proper inquiry as whether
the discriminatory animus of the biased subordinate influenced the final
274.  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006).
275.  Id. at 488.
276.  Id.
277.  Id. 
278.  While the cases in this section and the cases in Part II.B.1, supra, do not clearly speak
of causation, it is not this note’s contention that the causation requirement is non-existent in
these cases.  Rather, the disagreement can likely be seen as one of degree.  These cases are
included to demonstrate the potential for misapplication that accompanies the vague language
employed, which in turn, lends further support for the viability of the Tenth Circuit’s clear
causation requirement.
279.  Abramson v. William Patterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001).
280.  Id.
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decisionmaker.   As a result, the court held that the bias of the subordinate281
could be imputed to the final decisionmaker if the plaintiff could show that the
subordinate had “influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker.”282
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also addressed the issue of
subordinate bias liability.  While not recognizing it as such, the court has
stated that “[a] manager’s retaliatory motive may be imputed to the company
if the manager was involved in the [adverse employment action].”   The283
court found it sufficient to impute the retaliatory motive of the manager to the
company based on their finding that the manager provided the decisionmaker
with an assessment of the plaintiff’s abilities and that he advised the
decisionmaker to remove a qualification which had the effect of
disadvantaging the plaintiff.284
These cases tend to speak loosely of the causation requirement, couching
it in terms of whether the biased subordinate “influenced” or “participated in”
the adverse employment action and describing such evidence as relevant and
probative.  While all courts likely agree that the remarks of those involved in
a decision to terminate are relevant, not all courts would (nor do they) agree
that this alone would be sufficient to make an employer liable.  The absence
of a discussion of causation and the related role of an independent
investigation gives rise to an inference that an employer may be liable—not
on the basis of the biased subordinate having caused the adverse employment
action, but rather on the basis of any influence or involvement, no matter how
insignificant.
By ignoring causation, such a result has the dual effect of punishing
employers and undermining Title VII.  The potential burden on employers
who have made efforts to ensure that an independent, non-discriminatory basis
for the adverse employment action exists is great if the simple involvement of
a biased subordinate is sufficient to hold them liable.  Furthermore, the
influence or involvement standard is inconsistent with Title VII’s “because of”
requirement.  While it is doubtful these appellate courts intended to obviate
the “because of” requirement, the language they employ, taken to its logical
conclusion, suggests that an employer can be held liable even if there is an
281.  Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2002).
282.  Id. at 346 (quoting Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir.
2001)); see also Roberson v. Alltell Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a plaintiff alleging the cat’s paw theory must establish two things: (1) a co-worker with
discriminatory animus, and (2) same co-worker having leverage or influence over the formal
decisionmaker). 





independent, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action so
long as the biased subordinate was involved in the decision or exercised any
influence over the final decisionmaker.
C. Defending the Independent Investigation Requirement
The Tenth Circuit was right to recognize the role of the independent
investigation analysis as furthering the purpose of Title VII and being
consistent with precedent. Additionally, the independent investigation
requirement is fair to employers and employees.  While failing to define the
scope of the independent investigation, the Tenth Circuit did provide a starting
point from which courts could evaluate the ultimate issue: whether the biased
subordinate actually caused the adverse employment action.
1. Independent Investigation Requirement is Right, Recognized, and Fair
to Employers and Employees
Though the concept of an “independent investigation” appears nowhere in
the text of Title VII, the Tenth Circuit rightly focuses on the role and impact
of an independent investigation in subordinate bias cases.  The independent
investigation requirement is supported by other circuits who have addressed
the issue.  Furthermore, it is fair to employees and employers, thus making it
the right mechanism to further Title VII’s purpose of eradicating
discrimination without unduly burdening employers.
The independent investigation requirement is correct because it serves the
purpose of Title VII by ensuring that employees who are the victims of
intentional discrimination can recover even though the persons who made the
adverse employment decision did not act with any bias.  Employers could skirt
the law by establishing a system in which the final decisionmaker is free of
bias and yet relies solely on the facts presented to them by a biased supervisor. 
If employers were only liable for the final decisionmaker’s bias, they would
be rewarded by adopting a “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” policy. 
The independent investigation requirement allows employers to centralize the
personnel decision-making process without allowing them to avoid Title VII’s
requirements.  Employees benefit because employers are incentivized to
ensure that the facts giving rise to an adverse employment action are accurate.
Almost all of the circuits recognizing the claim of biased subordinate
liability have recognized the corollary independent investigation
requirement.   These circuits have held that the independent investigation285
285.  See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288 (4th Cir.
2003); English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001); Stimpson v. City
of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747,
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requirement severs the causal link between the biased subordinate and the
adverse employment action.   While none of them have outlined how much286
of an independent investigation is required, all have recognized that the final
decisionmaker must have made their decision independent of the biased
subordinate.   The Tenth Circuit was correct in joining these circuits. 287
Furthermore, it provided some parameters for the requirement: more than
reviewing a personnel file, but less than a full scale investigation.   The288
court’s less-than-subtle hint that the employer should seek the employee’s side
of the story  provides a practical starting point for courts to determine289
whether or not the biased subordinate has caused the adverse employment
action.  
Additionally, the independent investigation requirement is fair.  It asks
nothing of the employee and can only serve to benefit them, especially if the
facts against them are being fabricated or given a spin that is unwarranted. 
For example, in BCI, an independent investigation would have brought to light
the fact that Peters had called in sick and had been excused from work by Katt
prior to Edgar’s making the decision to terminate Peters’s employment. 
Unlike much of Title VII, the burden would be on the employer to engage in
the independent investigation.  At the least, the employer would be required
to attempt to get the employee’s side of the events in question.  Again, in BCI,
that simple action would have brought to light Peters’s legitimate reason for
missing work on Sunday.
2. The Scope of the Independent Investigation and a Modest Burden
Shifting Proposal
The independent investigation requirement will, in most instances, sever the
causal link between a biased subordinate and an adverse employment decision. 
Again, in BCI, if Edgar had made an independent investigation, she would
752 (7th Cir. 1998); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Stroh
Cos. Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1992).
286.  Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1331. 
287.  Id.
288.  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 2006).
289.  Id.  There is only one situation in which the first option might be onerous: failure-to-
hire claims.  There is some validity to a claim that being required to call every rejected applicant
to get their side of the story would not be practical.  However, rejected applicants will often
have greater difficulty proving individual disparate treatment, and they usually must proceed
with claims of systemic disparate treatment or disparate impact.  Additionally, an employer who
is monitoring its hiring practices to avoid a systemic disparate treatment claim or disparate
impact claim should have no problem identifying when an issue arises so that an independent
investigation could be conducted.  Ultimately, however, to the extent a plaintiff can prove that
they were not hired because of their race, the employer should be liable. 
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have discovered Peters’s reason for missing work on Sunday.  This would
have given Edgar two possible choices: one, accept that Peters was sick on
Sunday and excused from work, or two, continue with the decision to
terminate because she believed that Peters faked the illness.  If Edgar believes
Peters, then there is no reason to terminate, and Grado’s bias has not caused
any adverse employment action.  The harder question to answer is what to do
if Edgar does not believe Peters was sick, or believes he was lying?  In this
instance, the independent investigation may not have broken the causal link
between Grado’s bias and the termination.  A discussion of the scope of the
independent investigation and a modest burden shifting proposal will help to
answer that question.
It can be fairly said that the scope of the independent investigation has three
different levels: (1) final decisionmaker gets the employee’s side of the story,
(2) final decisionmaker conducts an independent investigation of the facts
leading to the possible adverse employment action, or (3) a full scale hearing
is conducted in which employer and employee present their respective sides
(a mini grievance arbitration).   The third option can be set aside because it290
is unrealistic for the vast majority of employers, and for those employers
whose employees are union members, a hearing will likely occur anyway. 
The second option is also somewhat burdensome for employers, but as will be
discussed, may be required of employers in some instances.  The first option,
as discussed previously, is not particularly onerous for employers and
provides a good starting point for determining whether the biased subordinate
has caused the adverse employment decision.
The recognition of these two remaining levels of independent investigation
is important to understanding this burden shifting proposal.  Under this burden
shifting proposal, an employer defending against a plaintiff’s claim of
subordinate bias would not be entitled to summary judgment unless they could
show, at a minimum, that they had undertaken efforts to gain the employee’s
version of events.  Upon such a showing, the plaintiff would be entitled to
point to specific facts demonstrating that the employer’s attempt to obtain
their side of the story was a sham.  In the alternative, the plaintiff could also
point to facts showing that the subordinate’s bias still caused the adverse
employment action even though they were given an opportunity to present
their story.  The burden would then shift back to the employer to dispute the
contention that the independent investigation was a sham or that there were
other independent reasons beyond the biased subordinate’s information which
290.  Surely a more imaginative writer could find far more nuanced differences in the type
and detail of independent investigations available to employers.  Three levels are employed for
purposes of brevity, clarity and sanity.  Further, the three levels described accurately reflect the
acceptable range of activities in which an employer might engage. 
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would serve as a legitimate basis for taking the adverse employment action. 
Often, this information would be gained by the final decisionmaker engaging
in the second level of the independent investigation: an independent
investigation of the facts leading to the possible adverse employment decision. 
Such an investigation could take the form of interviewing other employees and
supervisors, and otherwise gathering information relevant to the employee at
issue.  This burden shifting proposal can be put into practice through BCI and
Gee.
In Gee v. Principi, it was alleged that a decision not to hire the plaintiff for
a new job opening was the result of retaliation by supervisors with
discriminatory animus.   The decisionmaker conducted the first level of the291
independent investigation: he interviewed the plaintiff.   Under this burden292
shifting proposal, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment unless the
plaintiff could point to facts showing that his interview was a sham. 
Conceivably, the plaintiff could have pointed to the testimony of one of her
supervisors that he felt that she had been denied the job at the end of a
meeting in which two other supervisors with retaliatory motives provided
negative comments about the plaintiff to the decisionmaker.   The burden293
would then be on the defendant to point to additional, undisputed facts which
could have provided a legitimate basis for not choosing the plaintiff.  The
defendant in Gee could make this showing.  The final decisionmaker talked
with each candidate’s supervisors, met with the plaintiff’s co-workers, and
testified that his decision not to select the plaintiff for promotion was his
own.   This evidence was undisputed by the plaintiff.  Furthermore, the294 295
substantive nature of the biased supervisor’s comments—that the plaintiff was
absent from work and had trouble getting along with others—was not disputed
by the plaintiff.   Under the burden shifting framework, summary judgment296
could be seen as appropriate because the plaintiff could not dispute the final
decisionmaker’s legitimate basis for his failure to select her for the new
position.  In fact, the decisionmaker conducted the first and second levels of
the independent investigation.  He interviewed the employee, and he made an
independent investigation of the facts surrounding her performance, including
interviewing her other supervisors and her co-workers.
The question in BCI was: what if Edgars had asked for Peters’s version of
events, and not believing his version of events, proceeded to terminate him
291.  289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002).
292.  Id. at 347.
293.  Id. at 346-47.





anyway?  BCI failed to engage in the first level of the independent
investigation.  Had they done so, the need to engage in the second level297
likely would have revealed itself.  The interview with Peters could have
revealed that Katt would dispute Grado’s version of events.   Even if Peters298
did not know Katt could help him, faced with two differing version of events,
Edgar could have contacted Katt to see if he knew anything about the
situation. She then would have received Katt’s version of the events, which
would have undermined Grado’s account and verified Peters’s account.  Under
the burden shifting proposal, BCI would not have been entitled to summary
judgment.  Edgar could only point to the previous act of insubordination as an
independent, legitimate basis for terminating Peters.  Thus, it would be a
question for a jury to determine whether Edgar would be justified in not
believing Peters or whether Grado actually caused Peters’s termination.
Ultimately, the question for any independent investigation requirement
should be whether it breaks the causal chain between the biased subordinate
and the adverse employment action.  The levels of independent investigation
provide a framework for courts to analyze whether the employer was able to
break the causal chain.  By providing that an employer cannot succeed at the
summary judgment stage without an independent investigation, the employee
is allowed to go forward with his or her claims and present them to a jury. 
They must still prove that the biased subordinate caused the adverse
employment action.  Employers are incentivized, at the very least, to gain the
employee’s side of the story to ensure that there is a legitimate basis for taking
the adverse employment action.  The first level of independent investigation
may be sufficient to grant the employer summary judgment, but the employee
can still produce evidence that the independent investigation was a sham or
that it did not break the causal chain.  In this instance, the employer’s
undertaking of the second level of investigation may serve to break the causal
chain.
V. Conclusion
While the fables of LaFontaine were meant for children, they bear
important lessons for modern day employers. Subordinates, many of whom
may be “cunning, subtle and sharp and bearing a grudge against the whole
race of mice beside,” may be able to achieve their objective of clearing the
mice out of the house whether they have final decisionmaking authority or not. 
Unfortunately, in the context of employment discrimination, such actions are
297.  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 493 (10th Cir. 2006).
298.  Id. at 492. 
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not to the advantage of the master of the establishment, indeed they can be
very harmful to the employer.
BCI failed to conduct an independent investigation of Grado’s claims about
Peters’s conduct.  These claims formed the basis of Peters’s termination, thus
Grado can be seen as having caused Peters’s termination, and a reasonable
jury could have found that Grado’s bias was the reason he brought negative
facts about Peters to the attention of human resources personnel.  Causation
and agency principles, as recognized by other appellate courts and the United
States Supreme Court, support the Tenth Circuit’s decision to reverse the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit laid the foundation for future Supreme
Court consideration of subordinate bias claims. By focusing on the role of the
independent investigation, specifically the need to gain the employee’s version
of events, the Tenth Circuit provided the starting point for determining
whether the biased subordinate actually caused the adverse employment
action.  Of course, the plaintiff should be able to allege facts that the
employer’s independent investigation did not break the causal chain or was a
sham conceived to avoid liability.  This burden shifting process allows
employers, in most instances, to avoid the expense of a trial where they have
taken the simple action of interviewing the employee to ensure that the facts
surrounding the adverse employment action are accurate.  It also protects
employees who are the victims of a biased subordinate’s discrimination by
allowing them to demonstrate that the employer has made no real effort to
ensure the accuracy of the facts giving rise to the adverse employment action. 
The Tenth Circuit has thus provided the silver spoon of determining when
liability should attach for a biased subordinate’s involvement in an adverse
employment action.
Curtis J. Thomas
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